Looking back at Lincoln: On February 3, 1862
One of the great frustrations of Lincoln's first term in office (and undoubtedly of the war) was his inability to push, coerce, goad or force General 'Little Mac' McClellan into engaging the Confederate army.
Little Mac was by all accounts an excellent organizer when it came to training and drilling green troops. He enjoyed pageantry, parades, drilling and military maneuvers. But he was reluctant to engage the South in battle. He continually overestimated the strength of enemy forces, failed to seize tactical opportunities when they were presented, and missed several opportunities to win decisive victories that were well within his grasp.
Once, in growing frustration, Lincoln wryly noted that "If General McClellan isn't going to use his army, I'd like to borrow it for a time."
On one occasion, McClellan kept Lincoln waiting at his house for 30 minutes. When McClellan finally arrived, he walked past Lincoln without speaking, climbed the stairs and proceeded directly to bed.
Many people were outraged by this snub, but Lincoln continued trying to reason with his insubordinate general (who was very popular with the soldiers) in the hope that the Union would eventually see results. Lincoln later commented that he would gladly "hold McClellan's horse if he will only bring us success."
Executive Mansion,
Major General McClellan Washington, Feb. 3, 1862.
My dear Sir: You and I have distinct, and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac---yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the Railroad on the York River---, mine to move directly to a point on the Railroad South West of Manassas.
If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.
1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time, and money than mine?
2nd. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?
3rd. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?
4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable, in this, that it would break no great line of the enemie's communications, while mine would?
5th. In case of disaster, would not a safe retreat be more difficult by your plan than by mine?
Yours truly A. LINCOLN
Labels: Abraham Lincoln, Civil War, George B. McClellan, Lincoln Bicentennial
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